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Four	experiments	in	broadband	auralneirics	
I	
One	night,	I	dreamt	my	head	was	1,000	feet	wide.	The	expansion	was	executed	
between	the	outside	edge	of	each	of	my	eyes	and	the	inside	edge	of	each	
corresponding	ear;	the	distance	between	my	eyes	remained	the	same,	but	that	
between	my	ears	increased	greatly.		
In	the	dream,	I'm	sitting	dead	centre	in	the	Alix	Goolden	Hall	in	Toronto	
listening	to	a	pianist	(I	can't	say	who	it	is)	play	Bach's	Goldberg	variations,	
specifically	the	Aria.	The	playing	is	beautiful,	perhaps	the	more	so	because	there	is	a	
half	second	delay	between	the	visible	actions	of	the	pianist	and	the	music	I	am	
hearing.	The	delay	is	unsettling:	I	feel	at	once	as	though	I	am	acutely	present	and	
strangely	distant.	Present,	because	I'm	buzzing	with	the	new	configuration	of	my	
senses,	my	eyes	scrambling	for	a	purchase	that	would	let	them	skip	the	beat	that	
insists	on	separating	them	from	what	I	hear.	Strangely	present,	too,	because	there	
are	weird	congruencies	of	timing	when	what	I'm	hearing	does	seem	to	line	up,	a	
temporal	coincidence	that	isn't	really	that	surprising	given	both	the	world	of	
"continuous	multiscalar	transition"	that	we	live	in	(Hansen	2012)	and	specifically	
the	performance	space	of	the	concert	hall	which	(insofar	as	it	acts	as	a	space	of	
inscription)	increases	the	"probability	of	capturing	instances	of	differential	
repetition"	and	therefore	also	the	discovery	of	coincidences	(Hansen	2012).	
	 And	yet,	there	is	also	a	certain	self-dissociation	that	comes	with	hearing	
everything	in	delay:	what	is	experienced	temporally	as	a	deferral	is	also	experienced	
spatially	as	a	gap	within	myself	that	is	widened	by	the	heightened	reflexivity	of	
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hearing	myself	seeing.	That	is,	to	the	extent	that	my	senses	can	be	categorically	
differentiated	from	one	another—which	is	limited,	but	not	altogether	nonexistent—
the	temporally	non-coincident	experience	of	watching	the	pianist	play	a	half	second	
ahead	of	what	I	hear	is	parsed	as	a	temporally	continuous	experience	of	bodily	non-
coincidence:	I	hear	that	what	I	am	hearing	has	somehow	lagged	behind	my	vision	
without	ever	ceasing	to	hear	and	see.	My	seeing	is	no	less	visual	for	having	been	
heard.		
	 The	delay,	then,	feels	specifically	technical,	but	it	is	a	kind	of	autonomic	
technics,	a	machinic	weirdness	that	therefore	I	am	wherein	I	am	not-technical	
because	I	am	technical.1	As	Steven	Connor	notes,	"it	seems	less	natural	to	us	
[humans]	to	think	of	listening	as	tied	to	or	requisitioning	characteristic	
postures"(Connor	2008)	so	that	what	is	audible	in	the	delay	is—among	other	
things—precisely	the	machinations	of	perception,	the	“‘originary’	coupling	of	the	
human	and	the	technical”	(Hansen	2006,	9)	that	grounds	experience	as	such	and	
that	“can	only	be	known	through	its	effects”	(Hansen	2006,	9).	Thus,	this	feels	weird	
not	because	it	isn’t	natural	and	not	even	because	this	technical	element	is	explicitly	
sensible,	but	rather	because	the	ongoing-ness	of	this	coupling—the	‘coactivity’	of	
the	mutual	inclusion—is	somehow	both	conscious	and	nonconscious.	That	is,	this	
autonomic	technics	teaches	me	that	conscious	and	nonconscious	thinking	are	not	
experientially	opposed	to	one	another			
Importantly,	then,	the	strangeness	of	the	experience	persists	even	as	I	close	
my	eyes	(and	thereby	disintegrate	the	categorical	sensory	dissociation);	when	
																																																								
1	See	(Derrida	2002).		
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synchronization	is	no	longer	even	a	sensible	question,	its	ludic	contrivance	remains.	
That	is,	in	closing	my	eyes	the	"what"	of	the	sensory	disjunction—the	purported	site	
of	the	strangeness—is	deemphasized	in	favor	of	the	"how,"	and	specifically	the	
manner	of	execution	(or	‘style’)	that	Deleuze	calls	the	"power	of	the	false	in	that	it	
'posits	the	simultaneity	of	incompossible	presents'	in	its	instantaneous	back-and-
forthing	between	[…]	disparate	domains	of	activity"	(Massumi	2014,	25–26).	In	
short,	the	weirdness	isn’t	simply—i.e.	categorically—differential	but	is	instead	a	
revalencing	of	the	contrivance—the	performative	fusing	without	become	confused	
(Massumi	2014,	34)—of	the	senses	that	is	mediation,	be	it	that	of	human/animal	
bodies	or	that	of	technical	systems	(or	both;	always	both).2	With	eyes	closed	and	
ears	wide,	the	previously	categorical	differences	of	my	bodily	sensory	apparatus	are	
rendered	modal,	which	is	to	say	as	"differentials	between	tendencies	that	are	
variably	coactive"	(Massumi	2014,	34).		
	 This	coactivity—which	"iteratively	express[es]	itself	in	an	emergent	line	of	
continual	variation"	(Massumi	2014,	34)—raises	the	question,	which	admittedly	
distracts	me	from	the	Aria:	will	a	perceptual	adaptation	akin	to	that	demonstrated	
by	Stratton	glasses	in	the	1890s	take	hold?	After	wearing	image-inverting	glasses	
for	four	days,	images	appeared	upright	to	George	M.	Stratton	until	he	concentrated	
on	them;	then	they	became	inverted	again.	That	is,	Stratton	found	that	he	had	to	
concentrate	on	his	vision	to	turn	the	image	upside	down	again,	especially	when	he	
																																																								
2	As	Marc	Couroux	likes	to	point	out	(via	Morgan	Fisher),	from	the	perspective	of	
analogue	film	production	synchronization	is	(in	a	sense)	the	most	contrived	
sound/image	relation	because	there	is	a	significant	technical	awkwardness	to	
combining	sounds	and	visuals	on	a	film	strip.	This	changes	in	the	metamedial	
context	of	digital	computers.	
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knew	images	were	hitting	his	retinas	in	the	opposite	orientation	as	normal;	which	is	
to	say	that	he	had	to	concentrate	to	flip	the	image	back	to	the	unnatural	orientation	
that	is	natural	to	the	technical	apparatus	of	the	glasses.	Thus—specifically	by	having	
to	concentrate—Stratton	deduced	his	brain	had	reprocessed	his	vision	and	adapted	
to	the	change	in	visual	orientation.	So	I'm	curious:	if	the	concert	stretches	on	for	
more	than	four	days	(roughly	96	iterations	of	the	complete	set	of	variations,	or	1900	
repetitions	of	the	Aria)	will	the	audibility	of	the	delay	become	collapsible	subject	to	
my	concentration?	
	 Unfortunately,	it	is	precisely	this	thought	that	wakes	me.		
	
II	
Another	night,	I	again	dreamt	my	head	was	1,000	feet	wide.	In	the	dream,	I'm	sitting	
at	a	piano	elegantly	playing	my	way	through	the	Aria	of	the	Goldberg	Variations.	I	
sound	remarkably	skilled—much	more	so	than	I'm	accustomed	to—but	still	have	to	
track	my	playing	visually,	cocking	my	head	left	and	right	to	look	at	the	keys	that	my	
fingers	will	next	depress.	As	I	look	almost	90	degrees	to	the	left,	my	right	ear	is	
practically	brushing	up	against	the	piano	and	my	left	is	nearly	1,000	feet	away,	so	
what	I	hear	almost	immediately	in	my	right	ear	reaches	my	left	ear	nearly	a	second	
later.	Looking	next	to	the	right	the	effect	is	inverted,	with	varying	delays	at	different	
points	in	the	middle.	As	I	play	my	eyes	shift	targets	rapidly,	their	saccadic	movement	
flitting	about	the	keyboard,	so	these	shifts	are	frequent,	intermittent,	impulsive,	and	
rather	noticeable.	
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Given	my	physiology,	my	movements	also	produce	something	like	a	Doppler	
effect	in	my	listening.3	The	width	of	my	head—which	is	gigantic,	really—means	that	
each	twist	of	my	neck	results	in	a	profusion	of	bizarre	glissandi	something	like	an	
approaching	siren,	though	in	my	case	it	is	the	receiver	that	is	moving	rather	than	the	
sound	source.	Of	course,	as	I	rotate	my	head	one	ear	approaches	the	piano	at	the	
same	rate	that	the	other	moves	further	away	thus	producing	two	Doppler	shifts	that	
are	inversely	directional	with	respect	to	one	another.	Like	many	people	I've	a	
remarkably	symmetrical	head	in	this	respect,	although	it	is	worth	noting	that	this	
symmetry	is	literally	axiomatic	in	my	listening	rather	than	optical,	in	that	my	neck	is	
a	centered	axis	of	rotation.	In	this	way—as	Connor	would	have	me	anticipate	
(Connor	2008)—whereas	the	triangulating	perspective	of	my	vision	suggests	a	
(Cartesian)	point	of	view,	the	doubled	doppling	of	my	very	wide	head	insists	that	at	
least	two	points	of	audition	are	in	play.	
	 As	one	might	expect,	at	a	certain	point	the	turning	itself	becomes	more	
interesting	than	my	playing	and	I	begin	to	explore	variations	of	this	gesture	in	their	
aesthetic	possibilites,	an	exploration	that	is	made	technically	possible	by	the	magic	
of	dreaming	that	allows	me	to	at	this	point	completely	ignore	my	shortcomings	as	a	
pianist.	I	practice	turning	my	head	slowly:	almost	180	degrees	from	completely	left-
facing	to	the	right	over	15	seconds,	back	to	the	left	for	30	seconds,	to	the	centre	for	
																																																								
3	A	Doppler	shift	is,	basically,	created	by	sound	waves	'piling	up'	on	one	another:	in	
the	classic	example	of	an	approaching	siren,	for	instance,	the	emergency	vehicle	is	
emitting	a	frequency	at	a	fixed	rate	at	the	source,	but	the	waves	don't	arrive	at	a	
fixed	frequency	to	the	listener	because	the	distance	they	have	to	travel	decreases	as	
the	vehicle	approaches.	The	motion	at	the	source	thus	redounds	to	increase	the	
frequency	as	the	vehicle	approaches,	resulting	in	a	higher	pitch	at	the	point	of	
reception	than	that	which	was	sent.	The	frequency	of	course	then	decreases	as	the	
vehicle	recedes	
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30	seconds,	and	(a	relatively	quick	turn)	midway	to	the	right	for	5	seconds.	When	I	
move	very	slowly,	from	just	right	of	centre	to	just	to	the	left,	I	can	hear	the	delays	
changing	ever	so	slightly	without	really	hearing	the	Doppler	shifts,	which	is	rather	
lovely.	Indeed,	I'm	even	tempted	to	claim	that	this	inaudible	doppling	is	one	portal	
into	the	loveliness	of	hearing	itself,	in	that	it	suggests	the	Doppler	effect	as	a	
condition	of	hearing	that	persists	independent	of	one’s	consciousness	of	it.	
As	my	head	moves	the	Aria	sounds	unmoored	from	its	normal	pitch	centre.	
While	tonal	vagrancy	is	typical	enough	within	the	rhetoric	of	music,	the	modal	
difference	in	its	being	executed	within	that	of	frequency	is	unusual	(particularly	
with	a	piano	as	the	sound's	source).		When	I	stop	moving	the	Doppler	effects	also	
stop—or	rather	settle	into	the	ongoing	vibratory	rhythm	that	characterizes	my	
quotidian	auditory	life—leaving	me	with	sounds	arriving	at	each	of	my	ears	at	
slightly	different	times.	Remarkably,	each	time	I	move	it	feels	as	though	the	pitch-
center	of	the	piece	is	moving—I'm	experiencing	it	shifting,	after	all—but	when	I	
cease	moving	it	doesn't	so	much	sound	as	though	it	moves	back	as	it	sounds	like	it	
settles.	This	non-mobile	motion	is	a	sessile	modulation	of	the	piece,	then,	less	a	
modulating	from	one	key	to	another	(as	is	conventional	in	music)	than	a	non-
modulating	(in	the	musical	sense)	vitality	within	the	key	itself	(or,	put	differently,	an	
intra-modulation).		
And	then	a	thought	hits	me:	in	addition	to	the	changing	arrival	times	and	the	
inversely	complimentary	Doppler	effects,	there	is	a	dynamic	difference	in	volume	
between	what	I'm	hearing	in	each	ear.	This,	in	itself,	makes	sense;	but	is	it	really	
possible	that	a	sound	as	quiet	as	a	piano—played	at	a	mezzo-piano	dynamic,	no	
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less—can	still	be	heard	so	clearly	when	my	one	ear	is,	for	example,	a	distance	of	800	
feet	away?	I	think,	while	still	playing	the	Aria,	of	how	the	inverse	square	law—the	
law	that	describes	the	relation	between	distance	and	sound	pressure	intensity—
would	apply	in	this	case	and	can't	shake	the	feeling	that	what	I'm	hearing	can't	be	
right,	since	even	a	15	degree	turn	of	my	head	should	dramatically	attenuate	the	
volume	in	my	more	distant	ear	(while	increasing	that	in	my	more	proximate	ear).	
This	change	in	volume	should	be	quite	dramatic;	what	is	comfortable	when	I	am	
facing	the	piano	center	should	be	intolerably	loud	in	my	right	ear	when	I	turn	
leftwards,	and	pretty	much	inaudible	in	my	left.	While	the	changes	in	volume	that	I	
am	hearing	are	prominent	enough	to	sustain	the	sensation	of	a	change	in	distance	
that	accompanies	each	turn	of	my	head,	they	nonetheless	seem	to	be	happening	
much	more	moderately	than	this	basic	physics	would	determine.	In	short—and	
really,	quite	simply—I'm	flummoxed	as	to	why	playing	the	piano	with	a	1,000	foot	
wide	head	isn't	much	louder/quieter	than	it	is…I	look	down	at	the	piano	keyboard	
and	it	has	been	replaced	by	a	calculator,	flickering	dimly.	I	listen	for	a	few	more	
moments,	contemplating	this,	before	I	wake	up.		
	
III		
Another	night	I	dreamt	my	head	was	100	feet	wide,	still	rather	wide	by	conventional	
standards	but	more	slender	by	a	factor	of	10	than	I’d	become	accustomed	to	in	my	
dreaming	life.		
	 In	the	dream,	I’m	again	in	the	concert	hall	listening	to	a	pianist—Gould,	I	
think—play	the	Bach	Aria.	The	music	is	lovely	and	I’m	utterly	captured	by	it,	unable	
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to	really	move	beyond	the	minute	rotations	of	my	head	keeping	up	with	my	rapidly	
tracking	eyes,	which	dart	swiftly	and	wildly	in	so	far	as	eyes	do,	but	which	move	
very	little	in	actual	space	because	I	am	seated	some	distance	from	the	pianist	(and	
they	are,	of	course,	triangulating).	That	is,	my	head	hardly	moves	at	all.	One	
experiences	a	coddling	warmth	when	sitting	still	and	listening	with	a	100	foot	wide	
head—the	caress	of	an	almost	(in)audible	resonance—but	other	than	that	specific	
but	fleeting	affective	memory	of	a	slightly	more	lenitive	world	nothing	else	from	the	
dream	is	remarkable…nothing	takes	hold,	and	that	evening	I	don’t	even	really	
remember	waking	up.	
	
…		
In	The	Five	Senses,	Michel	Serres	argues	that	"listening	is	rooted	in	silence	and	
deafness"	(Serres	2008,	139).	As	Steven	Connor	recounts	in	the	context	of	tinnitus,	
Serres	notes	that	if	"one	understands	hearing	as	the	conversion	of	energy	into	
information,	of	materiality	into	intelligibility,	[…]	then	hearing	must	be	thought	of	as	
a	black	box,	in	that	we	know	what	goes	in	and	we	know	what	comes	out,	but	do	not	
know	precisely	what	happens	in	the	middle"	(Connor	2010).	He	continues:	"But	if	
we	ask	what	happens	in	the	brain,	which	we	are	content	to	see	as	the	simple	seat	of	
audition,	then	we	are	compelled	to	imagine	another	black	box,	for	in	the	brain	too,	
there	is	specifiable	input	(electrochemical	impulses)	and	output	(the	experience	of	
sound),	without	the	process	of	transformation	being	visible"	(Connor	2010).	The	
point,	though,	is	that	while	the	box	receives,	"the	reception	itself	is	not	transmitted.	
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We	must	therefore	be	located	inside	the	supposedly	closed	box,	the	walls	of	which	
must	as	a	consequence	be	moved"	(Serres,	quoted	in	Connor	2010).	
	 What	we	have	from	Serres,	then,	is	a	model	that	treats	audibility	not	as	a	
threshold,	but	as	a	vanishing	act	of	communication	itself.	As	he	outlines,	"either	
there	is	a	private	dimension,	in	which	case	there	are	not	objective	messages;	or	the	
latter	are	in	fact	in	circulation,	in	which	case	there	is	no	private	dimension"(Serres	
2008,	139).	Indeed,	in	binaural	listening	the	intensive	vanishing	act	performed	in	
and	as	the	moment	and	point	of	reception	skitters	over	to	the	other	ear	to	deafen	it	
extensively:	it	does	so	physically	by	"shadowing	"certain	frequencies	(which	is	
partially	how	sound	is	spatialized	in	binaural	animals,	including	humans),	but	more	
importantly	literally	because	when	the	same	sound	is	heard	binaurally	such	that	a	
certain	degree	of	difference	obtains	with	respect	to	volume,	the	quieter	"channel"	
becomes	inaudible.	That	is,	one	ear's	endless	string	of	black	boxes	precludes,	under	
certain	conditions,	the	emergence	of	the	initial	conditions	for	even	the	question	of	
communication	in	the	other	ear.	Stereo	ears,	then,	are	a	collective	system	predicated	
not	just	on	a	difference	between	its	component	parts	(i.e.	each	of	the	ears),	but	also	
on	an	inhibiting	mechanism	between	them:	I	know	that	my	ears	are	working	when,	
under	certain	conditions,	I	do	not	hear	in	one	ear	what	I	know	I	should	have.		
The	point	is,	a	sound's	audibility	is	not	just	relative	to	the	sensitivity	of	the	
receiving	apparatus	but	also	to	something	in	that	apparatus's	relational	framework,	
from	which	it	follows	that	audibility	cannot	be	understood	in	terms	of	isolatable	
properties.	More	than	this,	though,	this	irreducible	relationality	is	constitutively	
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obscured	in	that	it	operates	precisely	in	and	as	a	black	box	of	intra-cochlear	
communication.		
As	one's	head	widens,	this	obscurity	becomes	clear	insofar	as	it	becomes	
sensible,	which	is	to	say	in	so	far	as	it	palpates	through	the	symbolic	affordance	of	
sound's	organization.	That	is,	listening	directs	us	towards	sonic	activity	that	is	felt	in	
sound	as	a	quality	of	aliveness	or	abstraction	of	feeling	(Priest	2013a).	Thus,	by	
expanding	the	technical	condition	of	listening's	black	box—of	listening's	absolute	
relationality—what	is	felt	is	"non-sound,	an	extra-sonorous	semblance	of	aliveness	
that	appears	in	sound	through	a	technical	mode	of	listening"	(Priest	2013b).	
…	
	
IV	
One	night,	I	dreamt	my	head	was	a	thousand	feet	wide.	I'm	in	the	Alix	Goolden	Hall	
listening	to	Gould	again—I'm	sure	it's	him	this	time—play	the	Aria	from	the	
Goldberg	variations.	I'm	not	certain	how	I	got	here,	but	the	Aria	is	ending	and	it	
seems	that	the	performance	will	end	with	it,	rather	than	going	ahead	with	the	
Variations.	The	audience	applauds,	Gould	goes	through	the	usual	machinations	of	
post-performance	bows	and	ovations,	the	lights	come	up,	and	we	all	mill	about	and	
chat	as	we	exit	the	hall.		
I'm	aware	of,	though	not	particularly	surprised	by,	the	dream	logic	that	is	at	
work	in	my	surroundings:	the	basic	Mary	Poppins-style	conceit	that	it	is	somehow	
possible	for	my	head	to	be	wider	than	the	space	that	I'm	in.	What	really	strikes	me,	
though,	is	the	sound	of	the	concert	hall's	transition	from	a	"concentration	machine"	
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to	something	else.4	As	the	dominant	soundscape	expands	(to	almost	match	that	of	
my	head)	from	the	single	point	of	Gould's	playing	to	the	ambient	sounds	of	the	
applause,	conversation,	and	the	various	conflagrations	of	an	exiting	crowd,	my	own	
proprioceptive	sensibility	expands	with	it.	When	I	was	listening	to	Gould	alone,	I	felt	
in	an	important	sense	centered	and	agential:	I	could	compose	the	volume	and	delay	
of	the	Aria	for	myself,	within	constraints,	simply	by	turning	my	head.	My	massive	
cranium	was	something	of	a	private	inselberg,	an	isolated	mountain	with	lobed	
outcroppings	on	each	side.	As	this	(simulated)	aural	focus	dissipates	though—as	
Gould	leaves	the	stage	and	the	concentration	machine	becomes	simply	a	room	(if	not	
a	space)5—it	feels	to	me	as	though	my	mountainous	head	is	itself	returning	to	dust:	
there	is	no	longer	the	sense	of	inversely	proportional	changes	in	volume	and	delay	
times	because	what	I'm	hearing	in	one	ear	bears	virtually	no	resemblance,	at	the	
local	level,	to	what	I'm	hearing	in	the	other.	I’m	tempted	to	say	I	am	the	din,	but	that	
might	by	hyperbolic;	in	any	case,	I'm	literally	in	the	midst	of	it	and	outside	of	it,	and	
I'm	utterly	addlepated	by	my	incapability	of	telling	the	difference	between	a	sound	
that	has	traveled	across	the	room	and	one	that	is	proximate	but	quiet.	It	is	the	aural	
equivalent	of	holding	two	different	spyglasses,	one	over	each	eye,	pointing	in	
																																																								
4	The	concert	ritual	is	a	kind	of	technology	"whose	several	parts	together	function	as	
a	concentration	machine	to	actualize	the	idea	(virtuality)	of	music	as	a	pure	
aesthetic	object"	(Cecchetto	and	Priest	2013,	214).	That	is,	the	concert	music	
paradigm	can	be	characterized	as	"a	‘concentration	machine’,	which	serves	as	a	
synecdoche	for	music	whose	experience	is	organized	around	the	perception	of	its	
internal	formal	relations"	(Cecchetto	and	Priest	2013,	209).		
5	"Space	is	a	background	phenomenon;	it	is	that	against	or	within	which	things	may	
take	place.	Room	allows	for	no	background,	for	no	distinction	between	figure	and	
ground,	for	it	is	the	taking	of	place	itself"	(Connor	2008).	
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disparate	directions:	there	is	no	perspective,	and	when	there	is	no	perspective	a	
daschund	could	be	mistaken	for	a	miniature	pony	that	is	simply	further	away.		
Except,	my	eyes	remain	relatively	close	to	one	another,	so	I	still	have	vision	
as	a	means	of	verification.	Unlike	when	I	was	listening	to	Gould,	though,	when	my	
ears	lagged	behind	my	vision,	this	time	it	is	my	eyes	that	lag…not	at	a	rate	
determined	by	distance	as	in	my	hearing,	but	rather	at	one	determined	by	the	speed	
at	which	I	can	swivel	my	chin	atop	my	neck.	But	more	than	that:	it	is	in	a	real	sense	
myself	that	is	not	so	much	lagging	as	diffusing	in	a	bureaucracy	of	sound	which,	like	
every	bureaucracy,	impedes	agential	force	not	by	attenuating	the	speed	of	one's	
activities,	but	rather	by	routing	one's	actions	along	circular,	obscure,	and	repeating	
paths.	When	Gould	leaves	the	stage,	then,	listening	with	my	very	wide	head	becomes	
bureaucratic	and	tedious	in	direct	correspondence	with	the	increasing	complexity	of	
what	I	am	hearing.	It	is	a	crushing	sensation.	I	hope	that	as	I	become	more	skilled	in	
the	techniques	of	dreaming	I	will	find	a	lenitive	technique	to	live	and	listen	in	this	
setting	in	a	sustained	fashion,	to	listen	with	my	very	wide	head	outside	the	context	
of	a	concentration	machine.	On	this	night,	though,	I	linger	for	a	few	moments	
listening	instead	to	my	own	inadequacy	before	simply	waking	up.		
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